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Introduction 
Organizational Competitiveness  
 In order to compete effectively, organizations must capitalize on their competitive 
advantages within their business strategy.  Competitive advantage comes from “a firm’s 
resources and capabilities that enable it to overcome the competitive forces in its industry(ies)” 
(Dess, Eisner & Lumpkin, 2010).  Organizations derive their competitive advantage from various 
aspects of the organization and these advantages must be difficult to imitate in order to provide a 
sustainable advantage.  According to Michael Porter, there are three generic strategies to achieve 
competitive advantage.  The first is cost leadership, which is requires minimizing costs in all 
aspects of the business.  This does not necessarily mean that the company offers the lowest 
prices, just that they minimize their costs.  The second strategy is differentiation, which involves 
creating a product or service that receives industry wide recognition as being unique and valued 
by customers.  The final generic strategy is the focus strategy, used by companies that want to 
gain a competitive advantage by focusing on a very specific market (Porter, 1996).  There are 
countless ways to achieve a competitive advantage within these generic strategies.  Overall, the 
main competitive goal for an organization should be either to perform activities that are different 
from its competitors or to perform similar activities in a different way.   
Strategic Assets  
 One way that organizations can attain a competitive advantage within their industry is by 
utilizing their assets, both tangible and intangible.  Strategic assets must be “difficult or even 
impossible to copy” in order to provide a significant and unique advantage in the marketplace 
(Connor, 2007).  Strategic assets can be broken down into smaller categories by specifically 
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defining the durability and sustainability of these assets.  Durability refers to the ease with which 
an asset can be lost to the competition and sustainability refers to an asset’s lifespan.  When 
considering the durability of strategic assets, assets can be divided into tangible and intangible 
assets.  Tangible assets are defined as “organizational assets that are relatively easy to identify, 
including physical assets, financial resources, organizational resources and technological 
resources” (Connor, 2007).  Conversely, intangible assets are defined as “organizational assets 
that are difficult to identify and account for and are typically embedded in unique routines and 
practices, including human resources, innovation resources, and reputation resources (Connor, 
2007).  Generally, tangible assets are easier to lose to the competition than intangible assets 
because they are easy to define and consequentially, they may be easier to imitate.   
When examining sustainability, strategic assets can be divided into permanent and 
temporary assets.  Permanent assets exist throughout the entirety of the organization’s life and 
are still strategically critical throughout changing circumstances.  Organizations establish their 
permanent assets early and they serve as the infrastructure for the organization’s competitive 
decisions.  Temporary assets are contingent upon market conditions and only provide a 
competitive advantage over a finite period.  Organizations realize their temporary assets over 
time, after the initial formation of the organization and they are often specific applications of 
permanent assets for a short time.  Tom Connor sums up the relationship between the two types 
of assets, saying, “Temporary strategic assets are manifested in superior products, services and 
processes, whilst permanent strategic assets provide the underlying capability to produce them 
through time” (Connor, 2007).  A combination of both temporary and permanent assets can 
create a strong competitive advantage for an organization that knows how to utilize their assets 
effectively.   
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This paper will begin by defining exclusive contracts and examining the form and 
function of exclusive contracts in general. Following the introduction is an examination of 
exclusive contracts using an example-based approach. Each example will examine successful 
implementations of exclusive contracts.  This paper will conclude with a discussion of exclusive 
contracts as a competitive strategy, based on both theory and the discussed examples.   
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Exclusive Contracts 
An exclusive contract is defined as a contract between a buyer and a seller that prohibits 
one party from dealing with other agents (Segal & Whinston, 2000).  The specifics of these 
contracts vary greatly and are contingent upon the specific competitive aims of each participating 
organization.  The possible uses of exclusive contracts vary between different industries, as does 
the approval of their use.  Some companies view exclusive contracts as a means of ensuring that 
their organization develops a relationship with one supplier while preventing other companies 
from imitating their unique product.  Exclusive contracts may also be effective in protecting a 
company’s time and investment from imitators.  Despite potential positive returns on exclusive 
contracts, negative effects are also possible and have been extremely prevalent in recent years.  
Although this paper uses the term “exclusive contracts” to describe arrangements 
between the supplier and buyer of a unique product, this term is generic and as such, there are 
many other terms that can be used to describe such arrangements.  Licensing agreements and 
exclusive dealings are some other situations where the concept of exclusive contracts can be 
applied.  However, it is important to note that exclusive contracts do not include agreements such 
as patents and trademarks.  While these limit the use of a certain product or brand, the company 
who filed for the patent or trademark has exclusive rights for the product.  Exclusive contracts 
must be between two or more parties and, while they can include rights to patents or trademarks, 
must include specifications on the rights granted to the other party.  Exclusive contracts also 
generally include time and performance restrictions; otherwise, the agreement may be viewed as 
a merger or permanent partnership between two companies.   
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This paper will examine exclusive contracts as a differentiation strategy achieved through 
the utilization of a temporary intangible asset.  Exclusive contracts are temporary because they 
are only valid over the specified period agreed upon in the contract.  Exclusive contracts are also 
intangible because they are difficult to imitate and cannot be traded away without approval from 
both parties.  Although an exclusive contract can provide a significant competitive advantage for 
an organization, changing market conditions or the expiration of the contract can quickly 
terminate that competitive advantage.  Studying exclusive contracts and their effects on 
organizational competitiveness can allow organizations to utilize them in an effective way, 
making the most out of the temporary competitive advantage.   
Historical Uses for Exclusive Contracts 
 Exclusive contracts are traditionally used to dictate the relationship between a firm and 
their suppliers.  Historically, the product exchanged was typically a resource or finished product 
that the buyer required for their business.  Typically, the buyer had other companies they could 
acquire the product from and, consequentially, the contract secured exclusive business between 
the two companies.  The most common alternative to exclusive contracts is vertical integration.  
Vertical integration is defined as “an expansion or extension of the firm by integrating preceding 
or successive production processes” (Dess et al., 2010).  Vertical integration offers the benefit of 
having a guaranteed supplier or distributer, like an exclusive contract, while also allowing the 
company to have complete control over the timing and quality of the material.  When a company 
integrates backwards and begins to supply their own product, they no longer have to worry about 
the delays in supply that can occur within an exclusive contract.  However, vertical integration 
can also be extremely risky.  If a company integrates into an industry with which they are not 
familiar, or in which they do not have core competencies, they can actually hurt their product 
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more than they help it.  Additionally, vertical integration requires higher overhead and 
administrative costs that can be avoided with an exclusive contract.     
 Another way that exclusive contracts were historically used was through exclusivity deals 
with a company’s distributor, known as exclusive dealings.  Exclusive dealings are “a vertical 
restraint that restricts resellers from carrying products of competition manufacturers” (Heide, 
Dutta & Bergen, 1998).  For example, Haagen-Dazs did not allow their distributors to carry any 
competing products.  This practice ensures that the manufacturer is rewarded for investments in 
advertising and training while receiving the distributor’s full effort.  Although this situation may 
seem ideal for the manufacturer, there are additional negative aspects to such agreements.  
Firstly, it is costly and inefficient to monitor the inventory of all distributors, so manufacturers 
are often unable to determine if the terms of their exclusive contract are being violated.  
Additionally, exclusive contracts with distributors take away the customer’s ability to compare 
products or raise their cost of comparing products, which may cause the distributor to lose 
customers.  Losing customers hurts both the distributor and the manufacturer, so this may 
discourage exclusive distribution contracts (Heide et al., 1998).  Limiting the availability of 
competitor’s products was seen as an ineffective business practice unless certain factors were 
present.  One of these factors is market differentiation, meaning that the products offered are 
unique and have a loyal customer base.  When higher levels of differentiation exist, it is more 
likely that the companies will enter in to an exclusive distribution contract.  Another motivator 
for these types of contracts is when there is a high threat of new competitors entering the market, 
although contracts used to deter entry can also be seen as anticompetitive.  Finally, firm size also 
affects the use of exclusive dealings because larger companies have more power to negotiate for 
exclusive distribution (Heide et al., 1998).  Although traditional studies of exclusive dealing have 
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found it to be an inefficient practice, modern successful examples of these types of exclusive 
contracts will be discussed later in this paper.   
Fisher Body – General Motors 
 The Fisher Body-General Motors exclusive contract is one of the oldest documented and 
widely studied examples of exclusive contracts available today (Klein, 2007).  In 1919, General 
Motors entered into a contract with Fisher Body that required General Motors to purchase all of 
its automobile bodies from Fisher Body.  There were two key exceptions to the ten-year supply 
contract: 1) General Motors could complete any existing contracts they had with other 
companies; 2) they could continue to produce their own automobile bodies.  At the time, General 
Motors had few existing contracts, so Fisher Body quickly became their only supplier.  
Additionally, General Motors only produced open bodies, which the industry abandoned shortly 
after 1919, so they relied on Fisher Body for all their closed body models.  Therefore, despite the 
previously mentioned exceptions, General Motors’ contract with Fisher Body was essentially an 
exclusive contract.  The main motivation behind the contract was to ensure that Fisher Body 
received compensation for their investments in technology that would allow them to produce 
General Motors’ specific closed bodies.  Although modern economists have disagreed about 
what specific accommodations Fisher Body needed reimbursement for, the most agreed upon 
theory is that they wanted compensation for their increases in capacity to accommodate General 
Motors’ orders (Klein, 2007).  At the beginning of this contract, General Motors invested $27.6 
million and received 60% ownership of Fisher Body Corporation.  Fisher Body placed General 
Motors’ shares in a five-year Voting Trust, which meant that Fisher Body retained veto power.  
This ensured that General Motors did not immediately gain control of Fisher Body (Klein, 2007).  
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 In 1922 and 1923, General Motors’ sales began to increase rapidly and they developed a 
need for geographically convenient body parts plants.  The original contract charged General 
Motors 17.6% over costs for bodies produced in order to cover Fisher’s additional investment, 
but this cost failed to consider the need for additional Fisher Body plants closer to General 
Motor’s assembly facilities.  General Motors’ change in demand gave Fisher Body an upper 
hand in the contract and allowed them to argue for terms that are more favorable.  Fisher Body 
was reluctant to create smaller plants closer to General Motor’s facilities and, consequently, 
caused holdups in General Motors’ production processes.  General Motors had little negotiation 
power because the contract prevented them from threatening to use a different supplier.  Instead, 
Fisher Body held all the negotiating power and was able to require additional funds from General 
Motors in exchange for the new plants.  The negotiations ended with General Motors building 
and leasing three of six new co-located plants for Fisher Body, with Fisher Body financing the 
remaining three plants.  This new financing agreement cost General Motors around $20 million, 
paid to Fisher Body.  By 1922, General Motors paid 50% of Fisher Body’s increased capacity 
costs in addition to the original 17.6% up charge on the cost of the bodies.   
 After General Motors’ Voting Trust ran out in 1924, General Motors began to consider 
the option of merging or acquiring Fisher Body to eliminate the extra costs they had been 
accruing since 1922.  The loss of the Voting Trust gave General Motors considerably more 
bargaining power to renegotiate the unfavorable terms from their previous contract, but General 
Motors felt they had the legal obligation to respect Fisher Body’s minority share so they did not 
immediately take over Fisher Body.  Around this time, however, both Fisher Body and General 
Motors’ stock prices declined rapidly and the idea of vertical integration began to make sense 
economically.  Finally, in 1925, General Motors announced their intent to purchase Fisher Body.  
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When the final agreement was reached on May 13, 1926 both companies experienced increases 
in their stock prices (Klein, 2007).  Although this case has mostly been used to illustrate the 
benefits of vertical integration, it also illustrates the risks of exclusive contracts when they are 
not utilized correctly.  After discussing some benefits and negative consequences of exclusive 
contracts, this paper will give examples of how exclusive contracts have evolved since then and 
the ways that contracts can be written to avoid the problems illustrated in the Fisher Body-
General Motors exclusive contract case.  
U.S. v. Microsoft 
 Another more recent example of exclusive contracts is the contracts Microsoft entered in 
to in order to promote their web browser, Internet Explorer, over other web browsers, 
specifically Netscape.  These contracts eventually led to an antitrust lawsuit in which Microsoft 
was found guilty.  Microsoft began using exclusive contracts in 1996, after the release of 
Windows95, in order to ensure that Internet Explorer was the main web browser used with 
Windows.  They entered in to exclusive contracts with a variety of sources that required either 
exclusive use of or preferential treatment for Internet Explorer.  In their exclusive contracts with 
computer manufacturers, Microsoft initially required them to sell both Windows95 and Internet 
Explorer bundled together and added a clause that said they could not remove the Internet 
Explorer button from the desktop.  Additionally, Microsoft added to the contract that the 
computer manufacturers could not place any items on the desktop that were larger than the 
Internet Explorer button (Whinston, 2001).   Eventually, when Windows98 premiered in August 
1998, Microsoft even removed the user’s ability to uninstall Internet Explorer from their 
computer.  In exchange for these exclusive contracts and for preferential treatment for Internet 
Explorer, Microsoft provided computer manufacturers with reduced Windows licensing fees and 
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other monetary incentives.  Essentially, Microsoft exploited the success of Windows in order to 
force users to choose their Internet Explorer as well.   
By summer of 1996, Windows also had exclusive contracts with fourteen of the largest 
Internet service providers (Whinston, 2001).  These internet service providers were unable to 
access Windows unless they promised to offer only Internet Explorer to their customers.  A 
customer could request a different browser and have it shipped to them, but the contract required 
that between 75 and 85 percent of all browser shipments were Internet Explorer (Whinston, 
2001).  These contracts also offered additional monetary incentives to switch existing customers 
from using a different program to Explorer.  Some contracts also required internet providers to 
make “differentiated” content that would be viewed better on Internet Explorer than other 
programs.  Overall, Microsoft’s exclusivity agreements were extensive and succeeded in 
blocking the competition.   
Microsoft first came under investigation for anticompetitive conduct in 1990, when the 
Federal Trade Commission began a case against Microsoft’s licensing practices.  This case 
resulted in a tied vote, and the Federal Trade Commission tried again in 1994 by bringing a 
lawsuit against Microsoft over their exclusive contracts.  At the same time, the Department of 
Justice issued regulations for Microsoft stating that “Microsoft shall not enter  into  any License  
Agreement  in which  the  terms of that agreement  are expressly or impliedly conditioned  upon:  
(i)  the licensing of  any other  Covered Product,  Operating  System Software product or other 
product” (Gilbert and Katz, 2001).  While this should have discouraged the continued use of 
exclusive contracts, Microsoft continued its use of exclusive contracts through the Internet 
Explorer contracts mentioned above in 1995.  Finally, on May 18, 1998, the government began a 
lawsuit against Microsoft saying that their exclusive contracts excluded rivals and allowed them 
 15 
to monopolize their market.  After examining Microsoft’s market power in the relevant industry 
and determining that their actions did indeed violate the Sherman Act, the court found Microsoft 
guilty on April 3, 2000 (Gilbert and Katz, 2001).  Both Microsoft and the government proposed 
remedies, from ending the exclusivity of the contracts to splitting Microsoft in to two separate 
companies.  While changing the company’s structure by dividing it in to two separate companies 
is the easiest way for the government to ensure removal of the monopoly power, it may also 
negatively affect the efficiency of the company.  Another proposed remedy for the case was 
financial charges against Microsoft for violating the Sherman Act.  While this does not 
immediately change the anticompetitive actions that initiated the lawsuit, it does punish 
Microsoft for their actions and serves as a warning for companies considering similar actions in 
the future.  The judge in charge of the case approved the government’s remedies, including 
breaking up Microsoft in to two separate companies, but after appeals the breakup was reversed.  
The court then issued a consent decree that required Microsoft to reduce their anti-competitive 
behavior.  The end to the antitrust suit finally came in 2011, after over 21 years, when the 
consent decree finally ended (Chan, 2011).  Although the final ruling was not as severe as the 
first, this case serves as a major landmark antitrust case and illustrates how seriously the 
government takes such monopolies.    
 Internal and External Benefits of Exclusive Contracts 
Exclusive contracts between organizations can benefit the company either internally or 
externally.  If the benefit is internal, the impact on company overall profits is less tangible.  
Internal benefits affect the company’s value chain, Michael Porter’s system for analyzing a 
company’s internal environment, which is comprised of primary and supporting activities.  
Primary activities include inbound logistics, operations, outbound logistics, marketing, sales and 
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service.  Secondary activities include general administration, human resource management, 
technology development, and procurement (Porter, 1985).  Although exclusive contracts may 
help to make these processes more efficient, establishing a link to profitability is difficult 
because the effects are more indirect.  However, if the benefit is external and affects the final 
product’s value to other traders, exclusive contracts can provide a competitive advantage that 
leads to decreased competition and higher profits.  Michael Porter developed a technique known 
as the Five-Forces Model of Industry Competition to analyze an industry’s external environment.  
The five forces included in this model are the threat of new entrants, the bargaining power of 
buyers, the bargaining power of suppliers, the threat of substitute products and services, and the 
intensity of rivalry among competitors within the industry (Porter, 1980).  When an exclusive 
contract is unique and difficult to imitate, it decreases the rivalry of competition among existing 
firms as well as the threat of substitute products or services because it ensures other companies 
cannot utilize the same product.  This helps to reduce the bargaining power of the buyers, which 
allows the firm to choose a price point that is most beneficial for their organization.  Exclusive 
contracts for unique products also decrease the bargaining power of buyers because they are 
unable to find another supplier of the same product.  Finally, effective exclusive contracts 
decrease the bargaining power of suppliers by allowing the purchasing company to establish 
standards and rules within the contract.   
Negative Impacts of Exclusive Contracts 
 The first possible negative impact of exclusive contracts is their potential adverse legal 
ramifications.  Exclusive contracts can be perceived as anticompetitive in nature and often lead 
to lawsuits.  The main source of legal concern stems from Section 2 of the Sherman Act for Anti 
Trust Laws.  This states that “every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or 
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combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony.”  
Exclusive contracts between industry leaders can provide an unfair advantage that discourages 
new entrants in the market and harms smaller industry members, creating a monopoly in that 
industry.  However, exclusive contracts are not immediately deemed anticompetitive and U.S. 
antitrust law must use “a rule of reason standard in which possible economic efficiencies are 
balanced against possible anticompetitive harm” (Simpson, 2001).  Although exclusive contracts 
may lead to monopolies, the costs of anticompetitive behavior to the participating organizations 
are extremely high.  Therefore, it is more likely that firms use exclusive contracts to gain a 
competitive advantage and the antitrust implications are an unfortunate byproduct that they must 
deal with subsequently.  Specific legal issues will be discussed later in this paper when 
examining current examples of exclusive contracts. 
A second possible negative impact of exclusive contracts is free riding.  Free riding exists 
when one of the participants reduces efforts because their contract is guaranteed (deMeza & 
Selvaggi, 2007).  Although the exclusive contract provides benefits for both parties, one group’s 
interests may receive better representation than the others may. Potential pitfalls in exclusive 
contracts concerning free riding include “the licensee may devote inadequate complementary 
resources, or learn from the licensor and then commercialize its own technology, or its priorities 
may change over time, or it may simply be less capable than initially thought” (Somaya, Kim, & 
Vonortas, p. 162, 2010).  Situations like this are not beneficial and consequently, care must be 
taken in writing and choosing the details of the contract to ensure fair dealings. Creating strict 
performance guidelines within the contract can prevent free riding behavior as well.  
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Another negative aspect of exclusive contracts occurs when a company’s free riding 
negatively affects the customer.  This effect is seen more in contracts where the product involved 
in the contract is unique or valuable.  If customer demand for the product is high and the product 
is exclusively sold through one company, that company no longer has an incentive to improve 
aspects of their performance.   This includes customer service, research and development, and 
repair services.  Lack of effort, free riding, and legal issues all negatively affect the customer’s 
perceptions of the companies involved in the exclusive contract and can damage the reputation of 
the companies involved.  More examples of negative customer perceptions will be discussed 
later in this paper.   
Exclusive contracts provide a platform for companies to deter competition for a 
temporary period.  However, this practice can lead to adverse legal ramifications and negative 
consumer perception.  As such, companies need to carefully weigh their options before entering 
into an exclusive contract and must manage such contracts carefully so that the short term 
benefits are not negated by long term damage to a company’s reputation. 
Introduce Examples 
 The following sections will provide examples of the use of exclusive contracts through 
the examination of AT&T and Apple, Ticketmaster, Pfizer’s exclusive contract for Lipitor, and 
Sony’s exclusive contracts for Playstation games.  Each example varies in the way the contracts 
are used and accepted.  In the first example, AT&T and Apple use a short-term exclusive 
contract to deter competition for each company.  The second example, Ticketmaster, uses many 
exclusive contracts to ensure that they have exclusive access to a majority of venues while 
rewarding the contracted organizations with a monetary incentive to sign the contract.  The third 
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example, Pfizer’s exclusive contract for Lipitor, shows how widely accepted exclusive contracts 
are in the Pharmaceutical Industry and the possible effects this has on both parties of the 
contract.  The final example, Sony, discusses the use of exclusive contracts in the video game 
industry by examining their contracts for exclusive Playstation games.      
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AT&T and Apple 
 The U.S. wireless industry has been rapidly growing since the demand for a wireless 
phone began to increase by 12% yearly from 2003 to 2008.  Currently the industry is comprised 
of four main players: device manufacturers, wireless carriers, broadband infrastructure 
companies and application developers.  The two players of main concern in this example are the 
device manufacturers and wireless carriers.  Currently, some of the top device manufacturers are 
LG, Motorola, Blackberry, and Apple, although there are many other phone manufacturers.  The 
cellular service market is considerably more concentrated, with the top four service providers 
comprising 80% of the U.S. market.   These four service providers are AT&T, Verizon Wireless, 
Sprint Nextel and T-Mobile USA.  There are other smaller wireless providers, such as rural 
providers, but they make up a very small percentage of the market.  As of 2009, over 95% of the 
U.S. population lived in census blocks where there were three or more wireless service providers 
(Zhu, Liu & Chintagunta, 2011).  Since there are few big players in the wireless provider market 
and customers have direct access to multiple options, the four big wireless providers must be 
highly competitive with each other to earn the most business.  The main areas for competition 
are “coverage (including factors such as dropped calls), plan attributes (price, rollover minutes, 
free calling to other subscribers of the same provider), customer service quality, and quality of 
handsets” (Zhu, et al., pg 10, 2011).  The last area for competition, quality of handsets, can affect 
the attraction rate of new customers to the provider; consequentially, an exclusive contract for a 
high quality phone can provide a large competitive advantage for a hardware company.    
Since 2007, Apple and AT&T have been under scrutiny due to their exclusive contract 
for Apple’s iPhone. Released in 2007, the iPhone offered customers the style and efficiency of 
Apple’s iPod Touch combined with all the capabilities of a standard cell phone.  The phone used 
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a touch screen for navigation and allowed customers to use Wi-Fi or cellular signal to access the 
internet.  Another novel feature of the iPhone was the use of applications, displayed on the 
phone’s home screen, to guide the user’s experience.  Although the original applications were 
limited, the iPhone’s features have allowed countless applications to be developed by third-party 
developers and sold through Apple’s App Store.  After Apple and AT&T began their contract, 
over two million iPhones were sold within the first six months.  When the iPhone was launched 
in 2007, its biggest competitors were phones that were primarily used by commercial customers, 
such as the Blackberry.  The iPhone revolutionized the consumer wireless segment and within 
two years it accounted for 10.8% of the worldwide cellular market share (Zhu, et al., 2011).  
Details of the contract 
 Apple created an exclusive contract in 2007 to make their iPhone available exclusively to 
AT&T and their customers.  Apple also implemented additional security measures to ensure the 
iPhone would not be compatible with any other wireless carrier while giving AT&T the right to 
exclusively carry the iPhone.  All software downloaded to the iPhone must be purchased through 
Apple’s App Store, which allows Apple to maintain complete control over the content of their 
applications.  Additionally, any software developed for the iPhone must receive Apple’s 
approval and the developer must pay a fee to have their software considered.  Apple also 
enforced AT&T’s exclusivity by adding a lock on the iPhone’s SIM card, which would prevent 
mobility of the software from the iPhone to a different cellular device.  These security measures 
not only ensured that the iPhone was incompatible with any other carrier, but allowed Apple and 
AT&T to maintain complete control over their unique product until the contract ended in 2011.  
The details of the contract have not yet been made public, but portions have been revealed as 
more controversy arises around the arrangement.   
 22 
Public opinion of the contract  
 In general, there are mixed feelings among wireless carriers on the fairness of exclusive 
contracts.  Larger wireless companies, such as AT&T and Verizon, support the practice, 
claiming it encourages innovation and competition.  It also encourages the manufacturer and 
wireless provider to work together, especially on marketing and sales.  Smaller wireless 
companies oppose the practice saying it negatively affects customers in rural areas by denying 
them access to the latest technology.  They claim it also limits customer’s options and can 
actually hurt competition.  Exclusivity is certainly not the standard within the wireless industry, 
but many of the most notable handsets have begun as an exclusive contract.  Typically, the 
contract lasts for several years or for the lifetime of the device, although rapidly changing 
technology places the average lifetime at around twelve months (Zhu, et al., 2011).      
When specifically considering Apple and AT&T, the level of negative opinions about 
their exclusive contract is considerably higher.  By creating an exclusive contract with AT&T, 
Apple was using exclusive contracts to create a demand for their phone that had not previously 
been reached before.  The other popular phone at the time the iPhone was released was the 
Blackberry, which used exclusive contracts on a much smaller scale.  Instead of exclusively 
working with one wireless provider, Blackberry made different versions of their phone 
exclusively available through different wireless providers.  For example, T-Mobile was the first 
to sell the Blackberry Pearl, Verizon was the first to sell the Blackberry Storm and AT&T was 
the first to sell the Blackberry Curve (Zhu, et al., 2011).  Additionally, the Blackberry did not use 
central software so it was easily adaptable among the wireless providers. Other phones had 
previously been available through only one wireless carrier but they were typically generic 
phones based on a similar model and customers had few complaints about their limited 
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availability.  Apple capitalized on the uniqueness of the iPhone and used their exclusivity in a 
completely new way by programming the iPhone to be deactivated if a different wireless 
provider or unapproved applications were used.   
AT&T’s mobile customers are required to sign a two-year contract when purchasing a 
new mobile device from the wireless carrier.  However, when AT&T signed the exclusive 
contract it forced customers to stay with AT&T for longer than two years because their new 
iPhone was not compatible with any other wireless carrier.  If a customer wished to terminate 
their contract with AT&T, their iPhone would no longer be functional and they would be forced 
to pay an early termination fee.  In addition, AT&T was not contractually obligated to subsidize 
any part of the consumer’s original purchase.  This created a “captive” customer base for AT&T 
that lasted for at least five years after the iPhone’s original release.  While this customer base 
incentivized AT&T to enter into an exclusive contract with Apple, it also removed the need for 
competition with other wireless carriers.  This guaranteed customer base “removes the market 
incentives for AT&T to improve customer service, upgrade its network, or respond to 
competitive prices” (McMurrer, p. 504, 2011).  The new rules created by the exclusive contract 
caused consumers to question the legality and fairness of the AT&T contract for the iPhone, 
leading to possible adverse legal ramifications for AT&T and Apple.    
Lawsuits against AT&T and Apple 
A lawsuit in the Ninth Circuit court, Holman v. AT&T, began on June 29, 2007 as a 
result of Apple’s then most recent update to the iPhone software, released on September 27, 
2007.  This update rendered any iPhone with unapproved software on it completely inoperable. 
Although Apple and AT&T’s exclusive contract has remained private, some key parts of the 
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contract have been made public.  The following section of their contract, as published in The 
Journal of Corporation Law, summarizes the ways in which Apple planned to lock iPhone 
customers into AT&T service: 
“[C]ustomers will be forced to renew with [AT&T], despite initially being required to 
agree to only a two-year contract… Apple will enforce [AT&T’s] exclusivity by 
installing SIM card program locks on all iPhones…[C]ontrary to standard industry 
practice, by which wireless providers subsidize the purchase of the cellular device in 
exchange for the consumer signing a contract with the provider conditioned on payment 
of a fee in the event of early termination, [AT&T] is not required to subsidize the 
consumer’s purchase of the iPhone, but nonetheless charges a $175 early termination fee” 
(McMurrer, p. 500, 2011). 
Additionally, the contract mandated that Apple and AT&T take legal action if anyone tries to get 
around the software lockout.  It also ensures that Apple will wait to begin developing an iPhone 
that would be compatible on other wireless providers (McMurrer, 2011).  
In 2008, Apple and AT&T submitted a motion to dismiss the case but were denied based 
on the Grinnell test.  This test says that “power in a relevant market acquired and maintained not 
through business acumen but by leveraging technological control over the device” is in violation 
of antitrust law (McMurrer, p. 501, 2011).  The court also based their ruling on the definition of 
relevant aftermarkets as defined in the 2008 Newcal Indus. v. Ikon Office Solutions case.  This 
case focused on whether or not the aftermarket was “a natural monopoly resulting from the 
nature of the primary market, or if it was a contractually created monopoly” (McMurrer, p. 500, 
2011). In 2010, the lawsuit was granted class action status by Judge James Ware of the US 
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District Court, who again used the Newcal case as the bases for his decision. The new class 
action lawsuit stated that the plaintiffs in the case included “all persons who purchased or 
acquired an iPhone in the United States and entered into a two-year agreement with Defendant 
AT&T Mobility, LLC for iPhone voice and data service any time from June 29, 2007, to the 
present.” 
When considering the recent Apple and AT&T case, legal professionals have also been 
referring back to a tariff in 1968, during AT&T’s initial monopoly on the telephone industry.  At 
the time, AT&T was the only provider of telephone hardware in the developing 
telecommunications industry.  AT&T designed and developed its own equipment in order to 
standardize the production of telephones and quickly became the single dominant force in the 
telecommunications industry.  However, problems with AT&T’s dominance quickly became 
apparent, especially due to AT&T’s exclusivity.  Since AT&T developed its own products, they 
prevented the development of any third party hardware to be attached to their phones.  This 
practice blocked innovation in the early to mid 1900s, a time where innovation was necessary to 
develop emerging technology (McMurrer, 2011).  While individuals wishing to produce 
attachments for AT&T’s phones made multiple appeals, the one of most concern for today’s 
lawsuit is the Carterphone appeal in 1968.  The Carterphone was a device that supplemented a 
landline phone and allowed phone calls to bridge both wired and wireless communication 
systems using a Carterphone operator.  However, FCC tariff No. 132 stated that “[n]o equipment, 
apparatus, circuit or device not furnished by the telephone company shall be attached to or 
connected with the facilities furnished by the telephone company, whether physically, by 
induction, or otherwise” (McMurrer, p. 502-503, 2011).  The intent of the tariff was to allow 
telephone companies to create their hardware without harmful interference from inexperienced 
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third parties.  The court found that the tariff was over inclusive in the Carterphone case, as there 
was no apparent harm to the telecommunications industry in the new device.  Instead, the tariff 
was simply helping AT&T maintain its monopoly power by discouraging new entrants.  The 
resulting regulations “forced the separation of the sales of wireline telephone service from 
equipment and provided consumers the freedom to attach non-harmful third-party devices to the 
telephone network” (Zhu et al., p. 3, 2011).  The Carterphone regulations could potentially apply 
to attaching non-harmful third party applications to the iPhone, and questions have been raised 
about whether or not the same regulations should be applied to the wireless market.     
Effects of the Contract on AT&T’s Profits 
 Although little research has been done on the effects of exclusivity on wireless providers, 
the benefits for AT&T in this case are clear.  By providing a unique phone that no other provider 
could copy, AT&T not only gained new customers but also retained old ones past their initial 
two-year contract.  For example, 23% of new AT&T customers in the first quarter of 2009 cited 
their decision to subscribe as wanting “a phone not offered by my carrier” (which is assumed to 
be the iPhone).  Additionally, customers who had switched from another wireless provider made 
40% of new iPhone purchases during that time.  While both Verizon and AT&T attracted more 
subscribers in 2008, AT&T was able to attract more new subscribers than Verizon and most of 
their new subscribers chose to purchase the iPhone (Zhu et al., 2011).  In exchange for this boost 
in sales, AT&T spent $572 million on sales and marketing for the iPhone in 2007.   
 Although the benefits for AT&T are clear, the benefits for Apple are not as easily 
determined.  By making the iPhone exclusive, Apple succeeded in creating an overwhelming 
demand for their product.  However, Apple had already experienced success with their iPod 
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products and demand potentially would have been equally high if the phone had been available 
on all carriers.  Instead, Apple limited their customer base to about 30% of the United States.   
According to a study in progress on the effects of the iPhone’s exclusivity, it is estimated that 
Apple’s market share would have been .09% higher if both AT&T and Verizon had carried the 
iPhone.  If the phone had been available on all carriers, Apple’s market share would have gone 
up an additional 1.23% (Zhu et al., 2011).  This implies that exclusivity is considerably more 
lucrative for the wireless provider than for the device manufacturers.   
 Another unintended effect of the exclusive contract between Apple and AT&T was the 
creation of new competitors.  While any Smartphone released after the iPhone was compared, 
usually negatively, to the iPhone, Verizon’s Droid is the only model that came close to 
competing.  Although the Droid was later to market, it offered many features that the iPhone did 
not.  The Droid came with a better quality camera, additional memory space and a longer battery 
life.  Additionally, the Droid was considered more technically sophisticated than Apple’s iPhone.  
The iPhone was seen as overly simplifying its technology, while the Droid was more appealing 
to individuals who are technically perceptive.  However, the everyday user had come to 
appreciate and expect the iPhone’s user-friendly functions, so the benefits of a technical Droid 
were not appreciated.    Droid also had the advantage of using Google navigation software, 
which was superior to the GPS navigation software on the iPhone.  Additionally, the Droid had 
an open software system that allowed anymore to create applications.  This contradicted Apple’s 
strict rules about third party software on the iPhone.  Andrew Berg, a columnist, described the 
benefits of the Droid’s open software, saying “[w]hile the [Federal Communications 
Commission] may be a pain in many a side as it preaches any app, any device, on any network, 
that’s exactly the future for which most consumers are hoping.  While that ideal may never be 
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achieved, the Droid comes closer than the iPhone does” (Berg, p. 14, 2010).  Despite the benefits 
that the Droid was able to offer over the iPhone, few customers prefer the Droid.  Berg also 
noted that “while the Droid may succeed in stealing some market share from Apple, it’s simply 
not going to convert a significant number of loyal iPhone users who have become accustomed to 
a very unique kind of simplicity” (Berg, p. 14, 2010).   While this may be true, the Droid still 
created competition that Apple could have avoided by making the iPhone immediately available 
on all carriers. 
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Ticketmaster 
Introduction on Ticketmaster 
 Ticketmaster.com, part of the Live Nation Entertainment group, serves as the number one 
ticket provider in the country.  Ticketmaster leads the market in online event tickets and has held 
that position for over twenty-five years with virtually no competition.  Since Ticketmaster’s 
merger with Live Nation, Live Nation Entertainment has become one of the most powerful 
forces in the music industry.  In 2010, Ticketmaster sold 120 million tickets worth $8 billion 
(Salter, 2011).  Although Ticketmaster has been hugely successful, they have undergone 
countless public attacks, including multiple lawsuits.  Their pricing system and position as a near 
monopoly have earned them the label of the most hated brand in the world, although they have 
remained the industry leader despite such bad press (Salter, 2011).      
How they Utilize Exclusive Contracts 
 Ticketmaster’s main competitive advantage stems from the exclusive contracts they have 
signed with thousands of venues throughout the United States.  While the specifics of these 
exclusive contracts may vary, the main implication of the contract is that any band who wishes to 
play in that venue must sell their tickets through Ticketmaster.com. Ticketmaster then makes 
their profit by charging processing fees for every ticket purchased, potentially taking some profit 
from the artists themselves. Ticketmaster also gives a cut of their profits to the venues who sign 
with them, providing incentives for more venues to enter into similar exclusive contracts.   These 
exclusive contracts changed the music industry greatly when they first began.  The traditional 
ticket seller agreement had venues paying a ticket vendor thousands of dollars to sell tickets for 
them.  Ticketmaster’s new agreements not only removed that cost, but also actually provided 
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additional income for the venues that signed with them.  This has allowed Ticketmaster to create 
what has been called a monopoly by critics, as bands and venues that choose not to sign with 
Ticketmaster are placed at a considerable disadvantage (Knopper, 2009).  Ticketmaster argues 
that this is not a monopoly but instead, it allows Ticketmaster to provide better services for their 
customers and the venues.      
Lawsuits 
 One of the first major complaints lodged against Ticketmaster dates back to 1994, when 
Pearl Jam filed an antitrust lawsuit against Ticketmaster over unfair service charges for their 
upcoming tour (Boehlert, 1995).  Pearl Jam wanted to charge fans less than two dollars for 
service fees, which would bring their total ticket price to eighteen dollars.  Ticketmaster wanted 
to charge fees two to three times that amount, which prompted Pearl Jam to file the lawsuit.  The 
lawsuit was originally prompted by the Justice Department, who wanted to investigate 
Ticketmaster’s monopoly in the ticketing industry.  At the time, Ticketmaster already controlled 
seventy percent of the market and Pearl Jam claimed that this gave artists no choice in where 
they could sell their tickets.  This lawsuit was the first time that Ticketmaster’s exclusive 
contracts became public.  Although many other bands agreed with Pearl Jam’s position in the 
lawsuit, most were reluctant to join them.  When trying to tour without using Ticketmaster, Pearl 
Jam was forced to perform at fairgrounds and soccer fields instead of the major venues that 
Ticketmaster controlled.  Pearl Jam was unable to defeat Ticketmaster in an initial trial in DC, 
due mostly to the company’s lobbying efforts, but continued to try through the Justice 
Department’s investigation.  A short time later, the Justice Department declared that their 
investigation was closed, with no findings against Ticketmaster.  Although Pearl Jam lost their 
case and was forced to cancel the rest of their tour dates that year, their attempt was not 
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completely futile.  Pearl Jam’s lawsuit pushed Ticketmaster’s exclusive contracting strategy into 
the public eye and showed that it was possible to take on the ticketing giant (Boehlert, 1995).      
Almost ten years later, in 2003, Ticketmaster faced with another lawsuit from a smaller 
band called String Cheese Incident.  At this time, Ticketmaster had increased their control over 
the market and had exclusive contracts with 90% of the country’s arenas and amphitheaters. 
They also began to have contracts with top concert promoters, who could then focus on gathering 
customers rather than the logistics of gathering the tickets.  String Cheese Incident decided to file 
a lawsuit against Ticketmaster because they had their own ticketing company.  The band claimed 
that Ticketmaster’s exclusive contracts and service charges block all competition, which violated 
the Sherman Anti Trust Act.  The main problem occurred when Ticketmaster tried to restrict the 
number of tickets traditionally held for bands to give to friends and family members (Greenberg, 
2003).  Ticketmaster felt that these tickets threatened their investment in the shows because 
bands were reselling them instead of giving them away in order to receive the total profit.  
Ticketmaster sent a letter to their clients saying that bands would not be allowed more than 8% 
in ticket holds.  String Cheese Incident was used to getting much more than this to sell through 
their own ticketing service, SCI Ticketing.  The band tried to fight Ticketmaster on this by going 
to different venues, but ended up straining their relationship with their usual venues and causing 
larger issues for the band.  Then, in 2002, it became public that Ticketmaster was allowing 
excessive ticket holdbacks for bands signed to the online ticketing service Musictoday in order to 
guarantee that Musictoday did not file an antitrust suit against them (Greenberg, 2003).  This 
infuriated String Cheese Incident further and lead to their eventual lawsuit against Ticketmaster 
in 2003.  Although the band’s claims were originally dismissed as unimportant by Ticketmaster, 
the lawsuit was eventually settled out of court.  
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Although no lawsuit was filed, major controversy arose again in 2009 when Ticketmaster 
had malfunctions with their system while selling Bruce Springsteen tickets for two shows in New 
Jersey.  Fans who wanted to purchase a ticket were immediately redirected to Ticketmaster’s 
secondary ticketing site, TicketNow, which sells Ticketmaster’s extra tickets at a much higher 
cost.  Since Ticketmaster is the exclusive dealer for most major performance venues, fans were 
forced to either purchase the high priced tickets or miss their chance to see Bruce Springsteen.  
US Representative Bill Pascrell from New Jersey addressed the issue after receiving complaints 
from his constituents, saying “there is a significant potential for abuse when one company is able 
to monopolize the primary market for a product and also directly manipulate, and profit from, the 
secondary market” (Pascrell, 2009).  This illustrates the power that Ticketmaster’s exclusive 
contracts give them over customer bargaining power.  Since Ticketmaster has sole access to the 
tickets for particular concerts, true fans have no choice but to purchase the tickets at any price 
Ticketmaster chooses.  
Main Competition and Comparison of Profits 
 Although some companies have attempted to detract from Ticketmaster’s success in the 
past, none have even come close to hurting Ticketmaster’s market share.  The only real threat 
Ticketmaster has encountered so far occurred when Live Nation opened Live Nation Ticketing, 
as they are the only company with comparable industry power in the music industry.  Fortunately 
for Ticketmaster, the 2009 merger of Live Nation with Ticketmaster put an end to the impending 
competition for online ticket sales (Salter, 2011).  Although other companies have been unable to 
truly compete with Ticketmaster in terms of market share, many companies have tried to 
compete by offering a similar product with slight variations.  The most direct competitor with 
Ticketmaster is TicketFly, although their market share is nowhere near Ticketmaster’s.  
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TicketFly was founded by former Ticketmaster employees and has attempted to steal 
Ticketmaster’s clients by offering free services and many social media services.  StubHub, 
owned by eBay, is the largest player in the secondary ticket market, and allows fans to sell extra 
tickets on their server.  Although StubHub does not compete in the same field as Ticketmaster, 
they have pioneered many features, such as interactive seating charts, that Ticketmaster now 
uses.  Another unique competitor for Ticketmaster is ScoreBig, a members only ticket site that 
utilizes a “name your own price” feature similar to the one used by Priceline.com.  Unlike 
Ticketmaster, ScoreBig focuses on selling the 40% of tickets that typically go unsold for a 
concert.  Finally, many artists have been choosing to promote their own tickets instead of going 
through Ticketmaster controlled venues.  These artists will offer presale tickets, bundled 
merchandise and other rewards to encourage fans to purchase tickets directly from them.  While 
all of these alternatives to Ticketmaster exist today, CEO Nathan Hubbard believes that their 
main competition will potentially come from “the Apple’s and Google’s of the world” and has 
attempted to make Ticketmaster more flexible and innovative to prepare for future competitors 
(Salter, 2011).  
Public Opinion 
 Despite their seemingly unstoppable success, Ticketmaster has been called one of the 
most hated brands in the world and has even earned the nickname Ticketmonster (Salter, 2011).  
Several artists, such as Dave Matthews Band and John Legend, have chosen to sell their own 
tickets and merchandise directly to their fans instead of using Ticketmaster as the intermediary.  
Ticketmaster’s CEO, Nathan Hubbard, spent most of his career prior to Ticketmaster trying to 
undermine the company by finding alternatives for him and other artists.  He began his career 
working for Dave Matthew’s manager Coran Capshaw, one of the industry’s most well known 
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innovators and Ticketmaster opponent.  Hubbard served as CEO for Capshaw’s Musictoday, 
which allowed artists to sell tickets and merchandise directly to fans.  Hubbard also helped 
launch Live Nation’s ticketing site before their merger with Ticketmaster, creating 
Ticketmaster’s most serious threat since they reached their position as industry leader (Salter, 
2011).  Currently, as CEO of Ticketmaster, Hubbard undergoes the challenge of trying to turn 
one of the most hated brands in the world into a well-liked, or respected, brand.  One of 
Hubbard’s main goals is to move Ticketmaster’s service fees to the beginning of the purchasing 
process so customers are aware of the full ticket price before purchasing.  While this keeps end 
users happy, Ticketmaster’s clients, the concert venues, have been skeptical about the change.  
Since Ticketmaster’s exclusive contracts are frequently renewed and renegotiated, Ticketmaster 
must maintain a careful balance to satisfy both their customers and their venues.  Previously, 
Ticketmaster had seemingly abused their exclusive contract relationships by not providing the 
service they required and, consequently, venue relations had suffered greatly.  The only way for 
Ticketmaster to retain its control of the market is to continue its exclusivity with the nation’s 
largest venues, and Hubbard has been trying to repair damaged relationships to ensure this 
happens (Salter, 2011).         
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Pfizer’s Exclusive Contract with Lipitor 
Overview of Pfizer 
 Since its inception in 1849, Pfizer has grown to become one of the largest pharmaceutical 
companies in the United States.  They have represented some of the country’s most 
groundbreaking new drugs and have had success with everything from Vitamin C to Viagra.  
Recently, Pfizer has found success with the drug Lipitor, commonly known as atorvastatin.  
Lipitor, when used in conjunction with diet and exercise, lowers “bad” cholesterol in order to 
prevent heart attacks and strokes.  Lipitor has been called the world’s best selling drug ever, 
bringing $10.7 billion in profit to Pfizer in 2010 ("Loss of lipitor," 2012).  Lipitor was initially 
introduced by Parke-Davis Research Company in 1997 and sold by Warner-Lambert, a much 
smaller pharmaceutical company.  Lipitor’s success fueled a bidding war to acquire the exclusive 
contract from Warner-Lambert.  Pfizer bought stock in Warner-Lambert until they were able to 
achieve a hostile takeover in June 2000, acquiring the rights to Lipitor in the merger.   
Exclusive Contracts in the Pharmaceutical Industry 
 Exclusive contracts are essential in the pharmaceutical industry in order to ensure that the 
creator of a new drug is properly compensated for his or her time.  The inventor of a new drug 
must first file for a patent so that they are guaranteed data exclusivity.  Data exclusivity refers to 
“a practice whereby, for a fixed period of time, drug regulatory authorities do not allow the 
registration files of a pioneer drug company to be used to register a therapeutically equivalent 
generic version of that medicine” (Gangil, Thunga & Nagaich, 2010).  This practice encourages 
innovation within the pharmaceutical industry because it allows the creator of the drug to receive 
substantial returns on their investment.  It also provides reimbursement for the time it takes to 
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test new drugs for efficiency and safety.  Estimates of the average total development costs for a 
new drug suggest that the total cost is around $800 million, with 60% of the cost incurred 
through testing (Gangil et al., 2010).  Without data exclusivity, generic copycat products could 
easily replicate the formula for the original drug without incurring the costs of testing, allowing 
them to sell the generic drug at a much lower cost.  Once the inventor has received the proper 
patents for data exclusivity, they enter into an exclusive contract with one pharmaceutical 
company who takes care of marketing the product.  These contracts help to further protect the 
inventor’s investment and prove profitable for both parties involved.  
Legal Aspects 
 The Bayh-Doyle Act of 1980 laid the foundation for government funded research by 
mandating that the inventor retain private control of their creation despite receiving federal 
grants.  This initial incentive for research doubled the patent count from research universities 
from 1979 through 1984, which then doubled again from 1984 through 1989 (Kesselheim, 2010).  
This illustrates the importance of reimbursement and patent exclusivity on research incentives 
for new drugs.  Next, the Orphan Drug Act of 1983 gave federal grants, tax breaks, and seven 
years exclusivity to orphan drugs after their FDA approval.  This act only applied to drugs that 
would treat rare diseases because the smaller patient market made it harder for pharmaceutical 
developers to recover their costs during the initial exclusivity period.  The Orphan Drug Act lead 
to the approval of 325 “orphan” products from 1983 through 2008, as opposed to 10 approved 
products in the previous decade (Kesselheim, 2010).  The Waxman-Hatch Act of 1984 changed 
the regulations for generic drugs, giving the first generic drug 180 days of exclusivity before 
other generic drugs could be made.  The intentions of the Waxman-Hatch Act were to encourage 
generic drug manufacturers to question approved patents and to create generics sooner by 
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rewarding them for the legal fees required to question a brand name patent.  This law has 
increased the number of generic drug prescriptions from 19% in 1984 to over 70% today 
(Kesselheim, 2010).  Although the Waxman-Hatch Act has been effective in increasing the use 
of generic drugs, secondary effects of the generic exclusivity period have been increasingly 
controversial.  Many companies with exclusive rights to brand name drugs have begun paying 
generic manufacturers to delay or give up their 180 days of exclusivity so the brand-name 
producing company can continue to profit.  While this may be effective in extending the 
profitable period for brand name drug manufacturers, it also delays the arrival of lower cost 
drugs to the market.  The final major act regarding drug exclusivity is the Prescription Drug User 
Fee Act of 1992, which allowed the FDA to charge a user fee in exchange for a faster drug 
review process.  This shortened the average review time of a new patent application from 31 to 
14.5 months; however, the number of drugs withdrawn after their approval due to safety 
concerns increased greatly (Kesselheim, 2010).   
Public Opinion 
 Although data exclusivity encourages innovation within the pharmaceutical industry, 
public opinion on the subject has been both positive and negative.  While legal mandates on the 
subject have good intentions, many of the above mentioned laws inadvertently reward unwanted 
behaviors and have been misused by manufactures in order to increase their profits.  As 
mentioned above, the 180-day exclusivity for generic drugs created by the Waxman-Hatch Act 
has lead to many settlements between brand name drug producers and generic drug producers in 
order to prolong the original drug’s exclusivity.  The Orphan Drug Act encourages the creation 
of drugs for rare diseases, but those drugs are still sold at a high price and will most likely 
recover their research and development costs without government aid.  Additionally, the patient 
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end costs of a brand name drug during the exclusivity period are often high, which has 
contributed to the rising costs of health insurance, especially in public insurers such as Medicaid 
(Kesselheim, 2010).  Most private insurance companies have drug programs that incentivize the 
use of generic drugs in order to cut down on their costs.  When the higher cost drugs are 
prescribed, patients will often times not adhere to the recommended dosage of a drug in order to 
save money, which can eventually lead to even greater health problems.  A survey conducted by 
Consumer Reports National Research Center in June 2011 found that “consumers continue to 
economize on healthcare by cutting corners in ways that may be dangerous. In the past year, 
nearly half (48%) took some action to reduce costs- up by 9 percentage points from 2010…and 
28% failed to comply with prescriptions ("Best buy drugs," 2011)”.  Therefore, while drug 
exclusivity may be in the best interest of the consumer by incentivizing the creation of new 
drugs, it is not always seen as beneficial by the public.    
Pfizer and Lipitor 
 Although the exclusive contract practices used by Pfizer are in line with the industry 
practices described above, Pfizer has recently encountered setbacks due to their exclusive 
contract for Lipitor.  Their first setback was a lawsuit filed by AFL-AGC Building Trades 
Welfare plan, a health and welfare benefit plan in Alabama, over an alleged anticompetitive 
agreement between Pfizer and generic drug marketing company Ranbaxy.  The lawsuit, filed in 
New York in 2011, claimed that although Lipitor’s original patent ran out on March 24, 2011, 
Pfizer and Ranbaxy conspired to delay the sale of generic drugs for twenty months (Hurtado, 
2012).  The basis for the suit was a lawsuit settlement between Ranbaxy and Pfizer in 2008.  In 
2008, Ranbaxy was the first to challenge Pfizer’s patent for Lipitor.  Pfizer promised Ranbaxy 
the rights to a generic form of Lipitor in exchange for a twenty-month extension on their original 
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exclusive production deal.  The plaintiffs in the New York case stated the following; 
“Defendants’ scheme was successful -- generic Lipitor did not become available for sale until 
November 2011.  As a result of defendants’ illegal acts, plaintiffs and the indirect purchaser class 
were forced to pay billions of dollars more for Lipitor than they would have absent defendants’ 
anticompetitive scheme” (Hurtado, 2012).  Another lawsuit began in November, when eleven 
pharmacies sued Pfizer for similar reasons in San Francisco.  These pharmacies claim that Pfizer 
and Ranbaxy not only delayed the availability of generic Lipitor but also engaged in price fixing.  
This is based on the current cost of Lipitor, $4 a day, as compared to the cost for a generic 
version, 10 cents a day (Hurtado, 2012).  These cases are both still pending.   
After Lipitor’s U.S. patent protection expired on November 30, 2011, United Sates sales 
for Lipitor dropped 42% and international sales dropped 24%.  Overall, this loss cost Pfizer 
around $5 billion in their fourth quarter profits ("Loss of lipitor," 2012).  Companies such as 
Watson Pharmaceuticals and Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd have recently begun making generic 
versions of Lipitor.  Since then, Pfizer has fought to retain the competitive advantage derived 
from the exclusive contracts through other less widely accepted means.  One of their main 
strategies involves offering large discounts to customers who agree to stay with Lipitor over any 
new generic versions.  By offering customers prices as low as $4 for a one month supply of 
Lipitor, Pfizer could potentially retain customers long enough that they could start charging 
normal prices again.  Additionally, contracts with healthcare companies such as United Health 
Group and Coventry Health Care provide monetary incentives for the companies to block sales 
of generic Lipitor pills.  These efforts have pushed the price of Lipitor even lower than some 
generic versions in order to attempt to maintain their market share.  Pfizer has also licensed the 
rights to make the generic version to a specific company, Watson Pharmaceuticals, in order to 
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retain some control over the production and continue to collect on the benefits (Armstrong, 
2012).  
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Sony’s Exclusive Contracts for Playstation2 
 When the video game industry began it focused on games for children; however, the 
video game industry has expanded beyond the children’s market and is now most popular with 
young adults (the average age for a game player is currently 33 years old).  Sales in the video 
game industry, including hardware and software sales, reached around $10 billion in 2005, a 
figure greater than Hollywood’s box office sales.  A video game system, by definition, is “a 
hardware platform that allows demanders (the video game consumers) to trade with suppliers 
(the video game publishers)” (Prieger & Hu, 2010).  While the video game industry is considered 
a two-sided market, meaning a combination of hardware and software sales make up the overall 
profits, the main source of profit comes from software sales.  Hardware developers Sony and 
Microsoft have even been known to sell video game platforms at a loss with the hopes of 
recovering their costs through either the sale of in-house produced games or license fees and 
royalties from independent game publishers (Prieger & Hu, 2010).   
 If a video game platform has only a few games created for it, it will die quickly die in the 
market place.  This was the case when Sega produced the Dreamcast.  Sega relied too heavily on 
only a few games and was eventually forced to end production of the Dreamcast platform in 
2001.  The main players in the video game industry today are Sony’s Play-Station 3, Microsoft’s 
Xbox 360 and Nintendo’s Wii.  However, this paper will focus more on the beginning of these 
hardware systems’ dominance, between 2000 and 2004.  During this time, Sony produced the 
Playstation2, Microsoft produced the Xbox, and Nintendo produced the GameCube.  These 
gaming systems first introduced some of the most well known exclusive video games during this 
time period, and are still exploiting the success of these exclusives today.       
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Exclusive Contracts in the Video Game Industry 
 Exclusive contracts within the video game industry have been extremely prevalent since 
the industry’s formation, led mainly by Nintendo in the 1980’s.  Video game hardware is of no 
use without the corresponding software.  Kazuo Hirai, president of Sony Computer 
Entertainment, illustrated this situation by saying “You can have the best technology, the most 
advanced box in the world. But without the applications, that box will only collect dust on the 
retail shelves” (Binken & Stremersch, 2009).  This realization is a large part of what has been 
driving the increase in exclusive contracts for video game software.  As of 2010, one-third of 
Playstation 3 games and one-sixth of Xbox 360 games were exclusive.  Exclusive games are 
defined as “games that can be played on one system, because the [platform] producer either 
created the game itself or negotiated an exclusive contract with a video game maker” (Prieger & 
Hu, 2010).   
 Hardware developers, such as Sony and Microsoft, have two sources of revenue from 
their product.  The first is hardware sales and the second is licensing fees for complementary 
software.   Most customers will only purchase one hardware system, so the availability of 
complimentary software is extremely important to hardware developers.  Additionally, studies 
assume that “platform membership by itself does not provide any utility to the customers. Rather, 
the utility from membership accrues from being able to buy and consume the complements 
available for the platform” (Mantena, Sankaranarayanan & Viswanathan, p. 81, 2010). 
Consequentially, hardware developers want to ensure that their collection of complimentary 
software is unique and successful enough to warrant purchasing their system.  Software 
developers have a larger incentive to develop software for larger hardware platforms, because 
more users own those platforms.  Smaller hardware developers who wish to expand their 
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compatible software portfolio can benefit from exclusive contracts because they take away 
business opportunities from the larger hardware platforms.   
 When beginning to develop new software, the developer can approach hardware 
platforms for either an exclusive or non-exclusive license for their product (or a game publisher 
can do this for the developer).  At this time, platforms can choose to either reject the software or 
accept it for their platform.  If multiple platforms are interested in exclusive contracts for this 
new software, they can begin a bidding war.  During this time, the hardware platforms also 
negotiate the licensing fee they will charge based on a percentage of the software’s total cost.  
After this process, the software developer or game publisher can decide which licenses to accept 
and can begin developing versions for the accepted hardware platforms.  The main 
considerations when deciding which company to provide exclusivity to are the console’s current 
and expected installed customer base (Prieger & Hu, 2010).    
 In addition to providing additional licensing revenue for hardware platforms, exclusive 
contracts have the potential to increase hardware sales.  Sales of the primary hardware depend on 
the availability of complimentary software; additionally, the introduction of exceptional, or 
“superstar,” software can increase hardware sales substantially.  On average, popular software 
can increase hardware sales by 14% (167,000 units) beyond the effects of other hardware and 
software attributes (Binken & Stremersch, 2009).  Superstar games are difficult to copy due to 
superior qualities and have substantially higher sales; the average software sale for superstars is 
1.3 million units while nonsuperstars are 187,000 units.  However, it is difficult to determine 
superstar status before a game is released because quality is often determined by consumer 
reaction.  Some games do not recover their costs at all while others, such as Grand Theft Auto – 
San Andreas, can have returns more than 30 times the average development cost (Prieger & Hu, 
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2010).  Hardware developers must take a risk when deciding which new software they should 
obtain an exclusive contract for because there is no verifiable test for superstar potential.  When 
software is chosen correctly, the rewards can be extremely high.  Hardware systems with the 
most exclusive superstars are the most successful (ie: Playstation and Xbox). Consequently, 
hardware platforms will pay extremely high fees to obtain exclusive rights to superstar software.  
Sony paid tens of millions of dollars to make software developer and publisher Take Two’s 
Grand Theft Auto exclusive to Playstation2 and Microsoft paid $50 million for two 
downloadable episodes of the same game (Binken & Stremersch, 2009).   
 Although the exclusive contracts described above are similar to the contracts that have 
spurred antitrust concerns in other industries (such as Apple and AT&T in the wireless industry), 
few legal complications have occurred in the video game industry.  The main legal case that 
relates to video game exclusivity is U.S. v. Microsoft, as mentioned earlier, in which Microsoft 
was charged with abusing its monopoly power by entering into contracts with Internet content 
providers and software developers to exclude competitors to Microsoft’s Internet Explorer 
browser (Prieger & Hu, 2010).  The main difference between the Microsoft case and video game 
exclusivity is the exploitation of monopoly power.  Since there is no one dominant hardware 
system, there is no monopoly to exploit.  Anticompetitive harm would only exist if a contract 
prevented entry or encouraged the exit of rival platforms that held potential value for customers.  
If a dominant hardware developer enters in to an exclusive contract, they force their competitors 
and potential market entrants with producing or contracting their own exclusive.  This can raise 
costs and diminish competition.  However, most video games have a short lifecycle (around 12 
months) and exclusivity provides diminishing returns.  According to a study on the effects of 
exclusivity, “[e]xclusivity helps a firm establish market share at first, but beyond a certain point 
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additional locking up of software supply no longer hurts rivals” (Prieger & Hu, p. 2, 2010).  
These factors have prevented antitrust litigation on the subject so far, although changes in 
industry practices may lead to such litigation in the future.  However, as long as exclusive 
contracts continue to allow firms to enter and establish market share without developing a 
monopoly, there may not be a need for antitrust intervention.   
Sony’s Exclusives 
 As mentioned above, Sony’s Playstation 3 and Microsoft’s Xbox 360 are the leaders for 
today’s video game industry.  When the two companies first experienced their success in the 
market, between 2000 and 2004, Sony’s Playstation2 was the overall leader.  Playstation2 was 
introduced in October 2000, and by 2004 they had maintained the highest percentage of software 
variety as well as the highest profits (Prieger & Hu, 2010).  The Xbox was introduced a year later 
and had a lower price and a higher hardware quality then the Playstation2.  Despite Xbox’s 
advantage in other areas, Playstation2 was able to remain the best-selling platform because it had 
a larger portfolio of available software.  The biggest success for Sony was the exclusive release 
of Grand Theft Auto on Playstation 2.  Grand Theft Auto is a popular video game that was 
developed by software developer and publisher Rockstar Games.  Three games from the Grand 
Theft Auto series have ranked as the top three software titles based on revenue; Grand Theft 
Auto: Vice City at $334.9 million, Grand Theft Auto: 3 at $319.9 million, and Grand Theft Auto: 
San Andreas at $276.5 (Prieger & Hu, 2010).  Sony has utilized exclusive contracts in multiple 
ways.  For their top seller, Grand Theft Auto: Vice City, Take 2 and Sony agreed to a one year 
exclusivity agreement, after which the game also became available on the Xbox.  The two agreed 
to a similar two-year exclusivity agreement for Grand Theft Auto 3 and a one-year exclusivity 
agreement for Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas.   
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 Despite the success from Grand Theft Auto, it is important to note that non-exclusive 
games brought in more revenue than exclusives for both Playstation2 and Xbox.  Even though 
Playstation2 had more blockbuster exclusive games than non-exclusive, their non-exclusive 
games still brought in more total revenue.  This may be because non-exclusive games earn 
revenue more quickly because their widespread availability can increase their popularity 
immediately after their release.  Additionally, 8 out of the top 13 software titles based on revenue 
were made immediately available on all platforms (Prieger & Hu, 2010).  Another example of a 
company that has been especially successful in producing non-exclusive software is EA games.  
They signed an exclusive contract with NFL in 2004 which gave them exclusive rights to NFL 
teams and players for five years.  EA has been able to leverage its competitive advantage from 
this contract as well as its market power to refuse exclusive contracts with platform developers.  
As of 2005, eighty-seven percent of their software was available on at least two platforms and 
they had seven games out of the top thirteen with the highest revenue (Prieger & Hu, 2010). 
The Decline of Exclusive Licensing 
 Despite the past popularity of exclusive licensing to one platform, the practice is 
becoming much less common.  Josh Rubin is the co-founder of Naughty Dog, a software 
developer that favored Playstation.  According to Rubin, “There’s no reason to do an exclusive. 
There is a huge financial disadvantage” (Van Zelfden, p. 58, 2007).  Many software producers 
only enter in to exclusive contracts because it will allow them to get a lower royalty rate and 
marketing assistance.  Rubin explained the problems with exclusives by saying “It’s kind of like 
selling your soul to get money to market the title and then when the title comes out, they don’t 
make as much money because it’s only on one platform, but it was the only way they could 
afford to promote the game in the first place” (Van Zelfden, p. 59, 2007).  Currently, no 
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hardware has enough units sold to justify exclusivity agreements.  Additionally, software 
developers have the potential for a much higher profit by making their software available on all 
platforms.  Games are becoming increasingly more expensive to make due to changes in 
technology.  Since it only costs a software developer 10-15% more to adapt the software to an 
additional hardware platform, software developers may need to pass by exclusivity to recover 
their costs.  Another consideration is the possibility of merchandising.  Many video games lead 
to movies, comics, action figures, etc. and exclusivity limits the potential customer base for these 
products.     
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Discussion 
Lessons Learned from Previous Examples 
 Although the examples discussed in this paper are from varying industries, they each 
have general business applications that should be considered by any company considering an 
exclusive contract as a competitive strategy.  The first example, Apple and AT&T, highlights the 
importance of considering customer’s needs when entering into an exclusive contract.  The 
second example, Ticketmaster, is similar to the Apple example but also illustrates the negative 
effects on public opinion when exclusive contracts are abused.  The third example, Pfizer, 
highlights the effects the end of a successful contract may have on a company’s profits and the 
importance of considering the law when trying to maintain your competitive advantage.  The 
final example, Sony and Playstation2, illustrates the uneven nature of exclusive contracts and 
raises questions about who really benefits from such agreements.  Many of these considerations 
are apparent in all four examples and, consequentially, general conclusions can be made about 
the proper use of exclusive contracts.   
 There are some similarities between the examples discussed in this paper that may 
indicate what types of companies are more successful when using exclusive contracts.  The first 
major similarity is product differentiation.  Each company that entered in to an exclusive contract 
offered a unique product or service that created new value for their customers.  In the cases of 
Apple and Sony, their products utilized a new technology that could not be found through other 
distributors.  Apple’s iPhone was especially unique and customers who wanted a smart phone of 
that caliber were forced to switch to AT&T to obtain it.  Sony’s exclusive games may have been 
similar to other available games, but the story of Grand Theft Auto was unique and 
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consequentially, many loyal customers were willing to accept the exclusivity of the game and 
purchase it for Playstation2.  In the case of Pfizer, brand name drugs are inherently differentiated 
because legally they cannot have serious competition until after their exclusivity period is over.  
Ticketmaster does not quite fit in to the differentiation standard because they achieve their 
differentiation through their exclusive contracts.  The ticketing service they provide uses 
technology that is similar to their competitors; however, they differentiate themselves by having 
access to the majority of the performance venues across the United States.  
The second similarity between the examples in this paper is the size of the companies 
entering in to the exclusive contracts.  Larger, well-established companies are more likely to 
initiate exclusive contracts because they have more power to negotiate for exclusive contracts.  
With Apple, their size and the inherent demand for their products allowed them the freedom to 
enter in to an exclusive distribution contract with any wireless provider they wanted.  AT&T was 
also previously established and could offer Apple access to a large customer base, which gave 
both Apple and AT&T bargaining power when entering in to their exclusive contract.  
Ticketmaster’s size gives them considerable power when negotiating their contracts and has 
allowed them to continue growing by signing contracts with new venues.  Due to their size, 
Ticketmaster has established such a large presence in the music industry that bands and venues 
that choose not to sign with them are placed at a considerable disadvantage (Knopper, 2009).  
When considering Pfizer, their size and resources helped them not only acquire the company that 
had the original exclusivity contract but also helped them take steps to retain their exclusivity 
beyond the original legal period.  In Sony’s case, size of the company is generally important in 
video game exclusivity contracts because it directly correlates to how many customers the 
software developer will be able to reach through their exclusivity.  Overall, company size is a 
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consideration and can lead to more successful exclusive contracts.  However, as illustrated in 
many of these examples, size can also open a company up to anti-trust lawsuits.  Therefore, a 
careful balance must be struck between using a company’s size as an incentive for exclusivity 
with that company and using their size to monopolize the market through exclusivity.        
Who do exclusive contracts really benefit? 
 Although exclusive contracts can be used as a competitive advantage, it is not always 
clear which company is benefitting from the agreement.  When the contract involves a unique 
product, such as the iPhone or a superstar video game, the product’s creator actually may be 
sacrificing profit by entering into the contract.  In Apple and AT&T’s case, Apple had the 
potential to make a much higher profit by making the iPhone available on all carriers.  The deal 
may have helped in increasing demand for the product, but that is hard to determine since Apple 
already had a loyal customer base after their success with the iPod.  By tying themselves to one 
wireless company, Apple narrowed their customer base to only 30% of the US market, excluding 
and potentially losing interested customers on other wireless networks (Zhu et al., 2011).  Since 
the typical wireless contract lasts for two years, the exclusivity of the iPhone for almost five 
years may have potentially lost them loyal customers who would have resigned their contract one 
or two times during that time period.  Additionally, restricting the iPhone to one carrier forced 
other wireless carriers to find new ways to compete.  This lead to the creation of new smart 
phones, such as Verizon’s Droid, that attempted to imitate the iPhone’s qualities.  Although these 
new smart phones have not surpassed the iPhone’s popularity, they still take potential customers 
away from the iPhone.  Alternatively, the Blackberry was released on all carriers and there was 
no need to create similar commercial devices because all customers had access to the Blackberry.  
Although Apple has a large market share now, they may have had larger control of the market if 
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the iPhone had been immediately available on all carriers.  AT&T, on the other hand, benefited 
greatly from the iPhone’s exclusivity.  Not only were they able to sell the iPhone at a premium 
and collect on data charges, they were also able to steal customers from rival wireless providers.  
Consequentially, AT&T appears to have benefited much more than Apple in their exclusive 
contract.   
A similar situation appears in the case of Sony and their exclusive video games.  As 
mentioned before, software producers have the potential to make a lot more money when they 
offer their games on all hardware systems because it gives them access to the entire gaming 
community.   The main benefit from entering into an exclusive contract goes to the hardware 
producer because they are able to take potential profits away from their competitors.  The main 
reason for entering into a contract like this for the software company is to subsidize the cost of 
producing the software.  They can also receive marketing and sales assistance from the hardware 
company.  Hardware companies are aware that they receive most of the benefit from an 
exclusive contract, which is why they offer software companies high initial payments and low 
royalty rates in exchange for exclusivity.    
 In the case of Ticketmaster, the exclusive contracts clearly benefits Ticketmaster more 
than the venues that enter into the contracts with them.  However, another concern here is how 
their exclusive contracts negatively impact their customers.  Their exclusive contracts have 
removed their customer’s ability to choose what company they want to work with.  When 
considering the artists as the customers, one just has to refer back to the Pearl Jam lawsuit to see 
the negative effects.  Pearl Jam was unable to tour for a summer when they tried to avoid using 
Ticketmaster and suffered greatly from their attempt (Boehlert, 1995).  Ticketmaster’s other 
customers, concertgoers, also suffer due to Ticketmaster’s control over most venues.  Customers 
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have very little bargaining power because they lack options and, consequentially, Ticketmaster 
has considerable freedom when setting their ticket prices.   
Pfizer has similar problems as Ticketmaster in regards to how their contracts affect their 
customers.  Both situations provide a competitive advantage for the companies involved, but do 
so at the customer’s expense.  Pfizer’s customers may suffer because they cannot afford to 
purchase brand name drugs.  This higher price is acceptable during the initial exclusivity period 
according to the pharmaceutical industry’s standards; however, the main harm occurred when 
Pfizer tried to prolong their exclusivity agreement beyond the legally mandated period.  While 
the original exclusivity period is in place to ensure that the drug’s creator is properly rewarded 
for their time and effort, extending the exclusivity period only serves to increase the monumental 
profits Pfizer had already accrued.  Their decision is not only potentially illegal, but also ignores 
the needs of patients using Lipitor.     
When is it beneficial to have an exclusive contract? 
 Although the examples discussed in this paper illustrate some of the negative aspects of 
exclusive contracts, they also hint at what conditions lead to beneficial exclusive contracts.  The 
main condition that must be considered when entering into an exclusive contract is whether or 
not it will create a monopoly for either company involved.  While the prospect of higher profits 
and decreased competition may be appealing, anti-competitive lawsuits and negative public 
image have the potential to cost much more in the long term.  Ticketmaster’s experience with 
this especially illustrates the effects monopoly accusations can have on a company’s public 
image.  While no company has been able to overtake Ticketmaster so far, there is still a chance 
that another company could.  Ticketmaster has made many enemies since they began taking over 
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their section of the industry; consequentially, there are many companies who are attempting to 
compete with and eventually surpass Ticketmaster.  When a company becomes the top in their 
industry, they become the company that everyone aims to overtake.  Therefore , they open 
themselves up to increased levels of scrutiny and competition.  Additionally, by creating enemies 
within their industry Ticketmaster has opened themselves up to the potential for even more 
lawsuits in the future.  Although their current CEO is attempting to repair these relationships, 
many people have spent their musical careers fighting Ticketmaster and it is unlikely that they 
will stop (Salter, 2011).   
 Another condition that may warrant an exclusive contract is when one company does not 
have the resources to properly market or create demand for a new product.  Apple and AT&T’s 
exclusive contract came close to meeting these conditions, but the high demand and lack of 
substitutes for the iPhone made the exclusive contract almost unnecessary.  Apple had the 
resources they needed to market the iPhone on their own but chose to partner with AT&T 
through an exclusive contract anyway.  Additionally, the demand for the iPhone was already 
high when the product first launched due to the success of the iPod.  Delaying availability may 
have frustrated customers and caused a decrease in demand over time.  Only customers that had 
an overwhelmingly high demand would make the effort to switch to AT&T for the iPhone; other 
customers may have chosen to do without in favor of convenience or a preferred wireless carrier.   
Software for video games is a good example of when an exclusive contract assists a 
company who lacks the resources to launch their product on their own.  As mentioned above, 
software companies have the potential to make more money when they make their product 
available on all consoles; however, rising costs of video game development has forced 
developers to seek assistance.  By making their product exclusive, software developers usually 
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receive an initial payment, better royalty rates and marketing assistance.  Software companies 
have also begun using short-term exclusive contracts, which could be potentially beneficial in 
other situations.  These short-term contracts give the software companies the assistance they 
need to launch their product while guaranteeing one hardware company a specified exclusivity 
period.  Then, once that exclusivity period is over, the software company is free to make their 
game available to all consoles.  These contracts usually last around a year and create a short 
period of exclusivity that can also assist in building demand for the product.  Additionally, 
having a year of exclusivity can give software developers a trial period to test the game’s 
popularity on one console before investing in development for other consoles.  This also protects 
the software developer if the game is not successful because they had help with the initial 
development costs and they did not spend the extra money to make the software compatible with 
other consoles.  Short-term exclusivity may have been a better option for Apple and AT&T 
because it might have prevented the level of customer dissatisfaction that resulting from their 
initial exclusive contract.  Had their exclusivity only been for a year or two, AT&T would have 
had the advantage of being the first carrier to provide the iPhone but their customers would not 
have been forced in to a five-year contract.  This change could have potentially allowed Apple 
and AT&T to avoid the lawsuit that they are currently facing.         
 When choosing to enter into an exclusive contract, it is also important to consider the 
alternatives available.  In cases where the motivation for the contract is resource sharing, a 
strategic partnership may be equally efficient.  This allows companies to share resources and 
knowledge during the development phase of a product without putting a specific time restraint on 
the relationship.  If Apple had entered into a strategic partnership with AT&T instead of an 
exclusive contract, they could have continued to offer benefits to AT&T but would have been 
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more adaptive when consumers began to demand the iPhone on other carriers.  Additionally, any 
issues about AT&T’s service or data charges would not have reflected directly upon Apple.  This 
flexibility is essential when releasing a new product because, even with careful planning and 
market research, companies can never know without a doubt how a product will fare in the 
market.  Furthermore, strategic partnerships allow for collaboration without making one 
company dependent on the other.  As mentioned before, a potential downfall of exclusive 
contracts is free riding.  A strategic partnership allow companies to work together but gives each 
company a more flexible exit strategy in case the other does not uphold their end of the bargain.   
 As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, another alternative to exclusive contracts is 
vertical integration.  Vertical integration also guarantees supply but gives the parent company 
considerably more control over the processes.  Sony’s main competitor, Microsoft, has been 
successful with this alternative.  Rather than use an exclusive contract to obtain exclusivity to 
Halo, Microsoft’s blockbuster game for Xbox 360, Microsoft acquired the software company 
that created the game.  This may be the reason that Halo and Halo 2, the 8
th
 and 4
th
 top software 
titles by revenue, are the only titles out of the top 13 that have been released on only one console 
(Prieger & Hu, 2010).  Microsoft created a high demand for the game and maintained complete 
control over the supply by acquiring the software company.  It should be noted that Bungie 
became independent from Microsoft in 2007, after the release of the first two Halo games.  
However, Microsft retained an equity interest in Bungie and exclusivity for all future Halo 
releases (Microsoft News Center, 2007).  Sony, on the other hand, eventually lost their 
exclusivity for Grand Theft Auto due to the short term of their exclusive contracts and was 
forced to fight for exclusivity when the sequel games were released.   
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Conclusion 
 Although exclusive contracts have been used in business since the early 1900’s, their 
recent uses have changed the way companies create exclusive contracts.  By using them to 
control a unique product or service, companies use exclusive contracts to gain control over their 
industry rather than the traditional contracts to create a relationship with a supplier or distributor.  
It is difficult to determine if this practice will continue since there have been anti-trust lawsuits in 
the case of Apple, Pfizer and Ticketmaster.  Apple and Pfizer’s cases are still pending but the 
outcomes of those cases may either incentivize or discourage future exclusive contracts.  
Ticketmaster has succeeded in winning all lawsuits they have been presented with so far, but the 
damage to their public image will take a long time to repair.  Although recent lawsuits have not 
ended negatively yet, one just has to refer back to the U.S. v. Microsoft case to see the possible 
negative outcomes from a lawsuit regarding exclusive contracts.  While there may be 
considerable benefits to exclusive contracts, the negative aspects potentially outweigh those 
benefits, making such contracts dangerous to enter in to.   
Companies who are interested in entering in to an exclusive contract must examine 
multiple aspects of the arrangement to ensure that their contract will be successful.  They must 
look at the risk involved for each participant in the contract as well as who receives the most 
benefit from the contract.  If the benefits are equal between both companies than the exclusive 
contract may be worthwhile. The contract may also be worthwhile if one company is sacrificing 
some of their potential external benefit in exchange for resources or assistance from the other 
company.  Companies must also consider the effects an exclusive contract will have on their 
customer base.  If there are any negative effects on the customers because of the exclusive 
contract, then the companies must be prepared to either handle the bad press or edit the contract 
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so that it is more customer friendly.  The final major consideration before entering in to an 
exclusive contract is the acceptance level of such contracts within that particular industry and the 
anti-trust implications exclusive contracts.  Lawsuits can be damaging and expensive, 
outweighing the benefits of added profits from the exclusive contracts.  If a company considers 
the potential negative outcomes and finds that their exclusive contract has a low risk of 
encountering them, then exclusive contracts can lead to higher profits and a guaranteed 
relationship with another company.     
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